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“If you unjustly thought that it is in your right to prevent free Muslim women from
wearing the face veil, is it not our right to expel your invading men and cut necks?”
Bin Laden1
A recent New York Times editorial characterized the 2010 decision by the French Senate
to ban face-covering veils as “government-enforced bigotry.” Readers reacted by either
applauding the French move (seen as “helping some of the most powerless women participate
more fully as equal citizens”2), or by condemning it in the strongest terms — actually
comparing the French to the Taliban.3 These responses reflect the polarization of public
opinion when it comes to such matters. They also relate to themes raised in Yildirim’s paper,
namely, veiled Muslim women “seeking to participate in public space,” and the role of states
in regulating dress codes.
In “liberal democracies,” the focus of Yildirim’s article, the question of religious freedom is
increasingly associated with a wide range of issues.4 Debates related to Muslim women’s
dress, specifically, often pit religious freedom, individual liberty, and cultural rights against
women’s rights and gender equality.5 My response to Yildirim’s discussion of national and
international legal responses to “headcoverings” does not concentrate on legal aspects, but
rather on gendered practices and their ideological roots. While Yildirim focuses on Turkey
(especially cases before the Turkish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human
Rights), I adopt a more global lens, recognizing that whilst historical and socio-political
specificities are crucial to grasp the nuances of each context, these questions nevertheless
relate to issues affecting our world at large. After summarizing Yildirim’s insights, I discuss
two main aspects of her argument: “headcoverings” as an expression of personal religious
identity, and “headcoverings” with respect to tradition. To assert that veiling cannot be
apprehended solely as a private choice, I then consider the ways state and non-state actors
promote veiling in various settings. My closing points address the need to distinguish
“covered girls” from adults, and the risks linked to defining human rights as a Western
project.

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
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Maïa De La Baume, New Bin Laden Tape Threatens France, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, at A13.
Brian Fuchs, Letter to the Editor, The French Ban on Wearing a Full-Face Veil in Public, N.Y.
TIMES, April 18, 2011, at A22.
Azhar Hussain, Letter to the Editor, The French Ban on Wearing a Full-Face Veil in Public, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, at A22.
Recent examples include: the status of polygamous marriages (France, U.K. and Canada, regarding
Muslim and Mormon communities), the ritual slaughter of animals (U.S. and Holland, regarding
the Santerian community and Jewish and Muslim communities), and the refusal by taxi drivers to
service passengers carrying alcohol (U.S., regarding Somali Muslims).
Rachel Rebouché, The Substance of Substantive Equality: Gender Equality and Turkey’s Headscarf
Debate, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 711, 732 (2009) (analyzing how gender equality arguments were
used in the Turkish veil debate to reach opposite conclusions).
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I. “Inadequacy” of International Human Rights Law and the
Complexity of Veiling
One of Yildirim’s premises is that human rights law fails to grasp the complexity of
meanings attached to veiling, a question that has long been politically charged. She relates
this “inadequacy” to three main factors, two of which I highlight here. The first is that
international human rights law reflects a legacy of Orientalist biases, characterized by
Western superiority and the intent to police the “Other”, seemingly for his or her own good.
Another factor is linked to national-security discourses arising in the post 9-11 context. These
reinforce the pervasive “saviorship” rhetoric mentioned above and contribute to a racialized
and gendered portrayal of all Muslims.6 Yildirim is right to point out that stereotyping is
prevalent, with Muslim men seen as sexist, violent potential terrorists, and Muslim women
seen as oppressed, submissive to patriarchal norms, and in need of rescue.7
This general analysis — gendered assumptions about “Muslims” reinforced by a “West is
best” theme, and how these may influence the human rights framework — informs Yildirim’s
review of court cases. She criticizes recent jurisprudence in Turkey as evidence of the court’s
“paternalism” and “general bias against Islam as a religion of inequity”,8 and argues for less
state intervention regarding dress codes. However, her contention that the state has become
“increasingly regulatory and punitive”9 in dealing with individual behavior may be
overstated. While Turkish cross-dressers and transgender individuals can surely attest to the
coercive powers of the state, whose policies with regard to dress are indeed gendered, this is
not a recent development. Historical legal documents confirm the Ottoman authorities’ longstanding interest in regulating clothing. A 1725 Imperial Edict warned “certain brazen
women” who had “the audacity of lifting the veil of virtue” of the severe penalties they faced
(including exile).10 In contrast, Atatürk exhorted women to abandon the veil in the 1920s.
Hence, the Turkish state does not appear “increasingly punitive” — rather, it imposes strict,
but varying, guidelines according to its fluctuating interests.
There is more to draw from: Yildirim also explores the various ways “women’s hair” is
framed, pointing at the multi-layered understandings attached to veiling practices and
discourses. She warns of politicians who instrumentalize veiling to justify their ideological

6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

This portrayal is popular among Western conservatives, including prominent scholars such as
Bernard Lewis, and fuels anti-immigrant rhetoric. See Michael Talent, Islam in Europe: A Defense
of
the
Burqa
Ban,
COUNTERPOINT,
http://counterpoint.uchicago.edu/archives/autumn2010/IslamF10.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). It
also fuels anti-Muslim xenophobia in other countries. See Shaikh Azizur Rahman, Hindu Group
Pushed for Hijab Ban, BULLETIN (Aug. 21, 2009, 2:08PM),
http://forum.mpacuk.org/showthread.php?t=43721.
For a historical perspective on the biased portrayal of Middle Eastern women, see Willy Jansen,
Dumb and Dull: The Disregard for the Intellectual Life of Middle Eastern Women, 3 THAMYRIS 237
(1996); see also MALEK ALLOULA, THE COLONIAL HAREM (Myrna Godzich and Wlad Godzich trans.,
University of Minnesota Press 1986).
Seval Yildirim, Global Tangles: Laws, Headcoverings and Religious Identity, 10 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 52 (2012).
Id.
Dress Codes and Modes: Women’s Dress in some Muslim Countries and Communities, WOMEN
LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS, http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/Turkey.swf (last visited
Dec. 21, 2011).
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projects and geo-strategic endeavors. Importantly, she also stresses that while various
“political movements have made a cause of woman’s hair”,11 “not all Muslim women cover for
the same reasons, nor do they cover in the same manner.”12 Yet throughout her article,
Yildirim emphasizes veiling primarily as individual expression of piety, and as respect of
tradition. This dual focus needs to be re-examined, as it apparently undermines the broader
range of meanings she previously outlined (from veiling as oppression, to veiling as a
resistance strategy against parental, state or community control).

II. Problematizing Religious Identity and Individual’s Choice
Given the deeply-held assumptions about Muslim women being systematically oppressed,
it is necessary to stress that some women have agency — e.g., are able to assign emancipatory
meanings to veiling, or to subvert processes that are fundamentally discriminatory. But it is
equally important to identify gendered power dynamics. Malaysian advocate Zainah Anwar,
former head of Sisters in Islam, recognizes that androcentric interpretations of religious
traditions produce mechanisms of control over women’s bodies, which do not apply to men.
Anwar evokes the resulting tensions at play in everyday life:
I wish the state would leave women’s heads alone. However, when it comes to the burqa or
niqab (face covering), I find myself conflicted about the role of the state in this. Personally, I
find the burqa really disturbing. [I wonder] at the sight of Arab men in shorts and sleeveless
T-shirts walking . . . with their wives all enveloped in black. Why does he have the freedom
to dress appropriately for a holiday in our hot and humid climate, while the wife is sweating
underneath her layers of clothing . . . I see not freedom of choice here, but oppression and
discrimination at work.13

Yet, the women Yildirim refers to “dare to cover their hair out of piety”14: they do so for
“religious purposes.”15 They “seek a place in the public sphere without sacrificing their
belief”16 and simply express “an individual choice based on belief and faith.”17 Here, veiling is
posited as solely reflecting one’s personal religious identity: the individualized “covered
Muslim woman” appears abstracted from social constraints and political trends. But identity
is not formed in a vacuum: individuals’ behaviors are not to be conceived as divorced from
social practices and political ideologies. Various scholars (from Foucault and Butler, to Lacan
and Wendy Brown) have criticized the liberal idea of an autonomous individual and
elaborated on the issue of subject formation. Yildirim does not seem to entertain the view that
individuals are the products of social relations: the notion of free choice dominates her
argument. Her insistence on “the religious-covered Muslim woman as an intelligent, self

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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Yildirim, supra note 8.
Id.
SIS Founder Zainah Anwar Answers Your 10 Questions, T HE STAR (May 14, 2011),
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/5/14/business/8655019&sec=business.
Yildirim, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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aware agent making meaningful choices about her body,”18 suggests a free-standing social
actor, free from coercion and external influences.
However, liberal democracies are not immune to the rise of the religious right globally
(Muslim and otherwise). In this context, one cannot afford to maintain an insular perspective
— and so, we must acknowledge that veiling is also part of a theocratic political project which
expresses itself through “ocular, corporeal, and spatial aspects.”19 Indeed, “in Turkey, one of
the arguments widely used against the headscarf is that it has been appropriated as a
political symbol, so the desire to wear it is not a disinterested one. . . . The Muslim body
becomes, for actors of Islamism, a site of resistance to secular modernity.”20 Yildirim appears
to minimize the stakes — and the influence — Muslim fundamentalists have in promoting
veiling and in defining outward signs of piety. She denounces the Turkish state’s “partial,
prejudiced [views] against Islam and what Islamic symbols mean.”21 The Muslim religious
right’s discourses incorporate similar arguments and “use Islamophobia to silence opposition,”
as Mona Eltahi has noted.22 Referring to the French ban on face-veil, the Egyptian columnist
remarked: “Some have tried to present the ban as a matter of Islam vs. the West. It is not.
Many Muslim women — despite their distaste for the European political right wing —
support the ban precisely because it is a strike against the Muslim right wing.”23 Recent
jurisprudence, including at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) level, reflects this
concern: the increased influence of extremely conservative religious actors in the public arena
and the shrinking of secular spaces.
Through her exclusive focus on individual practices, Yildirim succeeds in countering the
biased portrayal of veiled women. But by giving prominence to women’s agency above all
other factors, she does underplay the Muslim right’s political agenda (as well as the pressures
to cover themselves that many women face, including in liberal democracies). She denounces
the “problematic theme run[ning] through” Turkish jurisprudence where the hijab is
identified as “a political and religious symbol and not just an individual choice based on belief
and faith.”24 Yildirim’s emphasis on “personal choice” overlooks the fact that Islamist
ideologies and movements often seem, at first, a “mere presence in a society—appearing as
but one of the many “options” for religious observance or affiliation — [which transforms
itself] into a source of compulsion and ultimately, violation.”25 The currents within Islam
seeking to promote a theocratic project rely on multiple strategies, including the promotion of

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

24.
25.

Id.
Nilüfer Göle, Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries, 14 P UB. CULTURE 173, 190
(2002).
Id. at 181, 189.
Yildirim, supra note 8.
Mona Eltahawy, Rending the Veil — With Little Help, W ASHINGTON P OST, July 17, 2010, at A13.
Id.; see also Karima Bennoune, The Law of the Republic Versus the ‘Law of the Brothers’: Muslim
and North African Voices in Support of the French Law on Religious Symbols in Public Schools, in
H UMAN
RIGHTS ADVOCACY S TORIES 155 (Deena Hurwitz, Margaret L. Satterthwaite, & Doug
Ford eds., 2009).
Yildirim, supra note 8.
Dhaka Plan of Action, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS (WLUML), 5 (1999), available at
http://www.wluml.org/node/451.
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specific dress codes. One key justification with regard to veiling centers on upholding and
respecting tradition, an argument that should be further investigated.

III. Problematizing Veiling as “Tradition”
Yildirim criticizes the view according to which “the only liberated woman is one who
rejects tradition and religion.”26 This formulation is problematic, in part because it indicates
she may endorse the implicit correlation between (inward) piety and public performance of
(outward) “Muslimness,” as advertised by a specific dress code.27Also, uncovering one’s hair is
clearly associated with distancing oneself from “tradition.” This suggests an uncritical
acceptance of discourses produced by the Muslim religious right. While such discourses
commonly emphasize the need to respect “tradition,” they fail to elaborate about which
traditions are being upheld and which ones are disregarded in the process. Therefore, the
very notion of “tradition” needs to be scrutinized.
The Women Living Under Muslim Laws’ “Dress Codes & Modes” exhibition documents the
geographical and historical diversity of female clothing across Muslim contexts: traditional
garments and “headcoverings” are indeed varied, even within Muslim communities. But with
the spread of a global “Muslim uniform” for women, the range of styles has narrowed over the
last few decades. The only dress code, which is branded Muslim throughout the world, is the
hijab (or the emerging niqab) — while the colorful suits of Northern Malaysia, the loose
Bangladeshi dupata or the Malian boubous are increasingly rejected from what constitutes
acceptable, “traditional” norms. In others words, one particular tradition is selected and
carefully promoted as the true expression of Muslim religious beliefs. The fact that this
particular form of veiling originates from Saudi Arabia and Iran — two countries keen on
exporting their model of an “Islamic society” — should alert us to the links between its
increased popularity and the political goals pursued by Islamist groups. The veiling
phenomenon of the last decade is less about young women single-handedly endorsing
“tradition” than it is the result of concerted (rhetorical and financial) efforts on the part of the
Muslim right.
In spite of their diversity, Islamist groups generally aim to effect broad ideological and
societal changes.28 Their efforts involve active networking and the exportation of selected
“traditions” from one Muslim context to another. As must be noted, some of these models “do
not necessarily have any relation to the religious customs or traditions of the women upon
whom these proscriptions regarding dress, private space, domesticity and sexuality are
imposed.”29 The promotion of a specific female dress is part and parcel of this larger strategy
— as a result, the hijab or niqab trends often have no basis in the traditions of the countries

26.
27.
28.
29.
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Yildirim, supra note 8.
Are we to conclude that Muslim women who do not veil are less pious?
See Cassandra Balchin, Towards a Future without Fundamentalisms: Analyzing Religious
Fundamentalist
Strategies
and
Feminist
Responses
(Feb.
18,
2011),
http://www.awid.org/Library/Towards-a-Future-without-Fundamentalisms2.
Awaaz South Asia Watch (2006), The Islamic Right – Key Tendencies,
http://www.centreforsecularspace.org/sites/default/files/Bhatt,%20Islamic%20Right%20Key%20Ten
dencies.pdf.

Problematizing “Autonomy” and “Tradition” with Regard to Veiling

where they are being enforced and adopted. This development is not new and has been
documented in different locales where traditional dress codes were either outlawed or
replaced by hijabs. Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia provide examples where states or local
authorities have been complicit in “importing tradition” while allowing the dismantlement of
their own traditions. In Sudan, following the coup led by the National Islamic Front in 1989,
the “Islamic Dress Law” effectively banned the traditional Sudanese women’s dress (called
the toab). The new so-called “Islamic Dress” was identical to the Iranian model — not
surprisingly since Iran had in fact financed the mass production of these uniforms. Sri Lanka
provides another example: in 1983, at a time when Iran was securing economic deals and oil
exports, the Iranian government donated 50,000 hijabs to Sri Lanka. More recently, in
Malaysia, the north-eastern state of Terrenganu promulgated in 2004 that “Muslim women
will have to wear a headscarf drawn tightly about the face,” and there were indications at the
time that the “traditional loosely draped Malay headscarf will be banned.”30
The promotion of the hijab as the genuine “religious clothing,” one that truly deserves to
be stamped with an authenticity label, takes place across the world. Commentators focusing
on issues of veiling in liberal democracies may chose to apprehend the veil as an expression of
resistance to Islamophobia, or as a personal strategy to overcome strict family rules — all of
which are relevant observations. Researchers, however, cannot be blind to the politics at play
in both Muslim-majority countries and countries of immigration, nor to the fact that veiling
serves as a flagship to an Islamist agenda. Yildirim herself points out (albeit in relation to the
impact of 9-11 on the perception of Muslims) that “covered hair must be viewed in light of the
power dynamics surrounding international and various national politics”31 — a point I could
not agree with more. In the following section, I provide examples of recent attempts to impose
dress codes on women. Highlighting the trend towards veiling in Muslim contexts puts into
perspective the notion that free choice is to be taken for granted. Indeed, debates and
developments in Muslim-majority contexts do affect Muslim minorities and migrant
populations in the West as well.

IV. Enforcing Dress Codes: The Role of State and Non-State
Actors
Yildirim states that “one fact overlooked by many who speak of the oppression of the
headcovering is that only two states mandate headcovering by law — Iran and Saudi
Arabia.”32 This statement does not reflect the scope of existing legislations or policies, often
enacted at regional or city level, which require veiling. Selected examples drawn from the last
few years show to what extent women’s lives are affected by this trend, in contexts ranging
from Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. In all these settings, the pressure to
enforce dress codes is led by Islamist actors.

30.
31.
32.

Jonathan Kent, Malaysian City Rules on Women, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/3368115.stm (last updated Jan. 5, 2004).
Yildirim, supra note 8.
Id.

99

10 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2012)

In the Malaysian state of Terengganu, the main city of Kuala Terrengganu had, in 2004
(at a time when the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) was in power), “imposed its own dress
code for non-Muslim women working in the private sector.” Salahuddin, a spokesman for
PAS’ Youth section, clarified in a press statement the party’s take on individuals’ rights and
duties: “The question of violating basic human rights does not arise when enforcing the
compulsory rule of covering the aurat (parts of the body that should not be exposed according
to Islamic belief).” Salahuddin added that it was “not a matter of rights but of responsibility
to adhere to rules set by Allah.”33 In a similar development in Chechnya in 2006, the Chechen
government started “demanding that female state workers wear headscarves,” with local
women fearing their careers would be in jeopardy.34 The argument that veiling is a religious
duty enacted by god, or the threat to lose one’s job, are already potent incentives to adopt
specific dress codes.
Some women also face physical intimidation or legal pressure to conform. For example,
“[i]n 2010, the Chechen government expanded its ‘virtue campaign’ . . . Men in security force
vehicles assaulted women who weren’t ‘covered enough’ — who didn’t wear headscarves, long
dresses, long sleeves — with paintball guns.”35 Testimony of victims of these assaults attest
to the increased bullying women have confronted recently. Depending on the context, attacks
can be indiscriminate (directed at any random woman in the streets), or targeted, as in the
case of UN employee Lubna Ahmed Al Hussein. A Sudanese, she was prosecuted for wearing
trousers and sentenced to 40 lashes in July 2009. The basis of her conviction relates to Article
152 of Sudanese criminal code which prohibits “dressing indecently” in public, a charge that
carries a punishment of 40 lashes and a fine. She is far from being the only woman affected
by indecency laws. According to the director of police, in 2008 in Khartoum State alone,
43,000 women were arrested for clothing offences.36
It is necessary to acknowledge the disproportionate impact of dress code enforcement
mechanisms on women. Not only is the so-called “Muslim dress” specifically for females
(while men can disregard “tradition” and adopt the style of “modernity”), but the tactics that
are used — legal or otherwise — also primarily affect women. A 2010 report by Human
Rights Watch records this gender imbalance in Indonesia. The report documents “two local
Sharia-inspired laws [that] regulate Islamic dress and association between members of the
opposite sex” in Aceh province. Researchers note that
[a]lthough the law requiring Islamic attire applies to men and women, it is much more
onerous for women, who constitute the overwhelming majority of those reprimanded by the

33.
34.
35.

36.
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Kazi Mahmood, Malaysian City Imposes Islamic Dress Code on Women, ISLAM ONLINE (Jan. 10,
2004), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1055499/posts. This measure also “bans anything
that is considered moderately revealing clothing to sexy attires in public and private departments.”
Chechnya Starts Demanding Women Wear Headscarves, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS
(WLUML) (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.wluml.org/node/2868.
Annual Report 2010: Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights, URGENT ACTION FUND, 6
(2010), http://urgentactionfund.org/assets/files/annual_reports/UAF_Annual_Report_Web_2010.pdf;
see also You Dress According to Their Rules—Enforcement of an Islamic Dress Code for Women in
Chechnya, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/03/10/youdress-according-their-rules.
Lubna Hussein, When I Think of My Trial, I Pray My Fight won’t be in Vain, THE GUARDIAN (Sept.
3, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/04/sudan-woman-trousers-trial.
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Sharia police. While the law requires men to cover their body between the knee and the
navel, Muslim women must cover the entire body, except for hands, feet, and face.37

The role played by non-state actors also needs to be mentioned briefly. While their
accountability is often disregarded by human rights mechanisms, the conduct of non-state
actors does have human rights implications. By taking it upon themselves to “protect
modesty and morality”, they often create significant challenges to women’s human rights.
Whether representatives of private institutions (including religious ones) or self-appointed
guardians of community values, their ability to enact rules that affect the population at large
has been recognized. The term “Non-state legal orders” (NSLOs) refers to:
norms or institutions — often viewed as having the force of law by those subject to them —
that claim to draw their moral authority from contemporary or traditional culture or customs
or religious beliefs and practices rather than from the political authority of the state. In some
cases NSLOs flourish because the formal state legal order is alien, irrelevant or absent . . .
NSLOs may also draw their legitimacy from resistance to the state’s legal order or from
reforms that strengthen the informal justice sector.38

Examples where non-states actors have forced women to veil include Algeria in the
1990s39—where the feminist “[a]ward of women’s resistance against fundamentalism and
against forgetting” was given posthumously to Katia Bengana, a 17-year-old assassinated for
refusing to wear the hijab. Sanctions have been less drastic in France, but the pressure to
cover exercised by relatives or community members has been documented.40 Similar
developments occurred within the Indian Muslim community in the aftermath of the 2002
Gujarat massacres, and more recently in 2010 when the “largest Islamic Indian seminary
rule[d] that it is unlawful for women to work or interact with men if they do not wear veils.”41
Sri Lanka also witnessed an increase in veiling practices in the east of the country, linked to
the rising influence of Wahhabism (often imported by overseas workers back from Saudi
Arabia). “[I]n recent years local women have come under growing pressure from
conservatives. They are now urged to cover their faces in public, something that had not

37.

38.
39.

40.
41.

Indonesia: Local Sharia Laws Violate Rights in Aceh: Restrictions on Association, Dress Deny
Autonomy and Are Used Abusively, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 1, 2010),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/29/indonesia-local-sharia-laws-violate-rights-aceh;
see
also
Policing Morality: Abuses in the Application of Sharia in Aceh, Indonesia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/indonesia1210WebVersionToPost.pdf.
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, WHEN LEGAL WORLDS OVERLAP: HUMAN
RIGHTS, STATE AND NON-STATE LAW, SUMMARY 3 (2010), available at
http://www.ichrp.org/files/summaries/42/135_summary_en.pdf.
A leader from the Algerian Islamic Armed Group, Abou El Moundhir, announced in 1997 (in the
London-based newspaper Al Djamaa) that the GIA (Groupe Islamic Armee) had a “duty” to
“eliminate immodest or debauched women.” Numerous murders of unveiled women were hence
religiously justified. AL DJAMAA (London), 1997. For a documentation of the Islamist violence during
those years, see RESEAU WASSILA, LIVRE BLANC: TEMOIGNAGES DE VIOLENCES CONTRE LES FEMMES
ET LES ENFANTS (2002), available at http://reseauwassila.com/Livre%20Blanc%20reduit.pdf.
See Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves,
Religious Expression, and Women's Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
367 (2007).
Shaikh A. Rahman, Indian Protest at Muftis’ Ban on Women at Work, THE NATIONAL (May 21,
2010),http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/south-asia/indian-protest-at-muftis-ban-onwomen-at-work?pageCount=0.
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previously been the cultural practice there.”42 In Colombo, female students report being
pressured to veil on university compounds: male peers want them to conform to the ideal of a
“good Muslim woman” arguing that they “represent the community.”43 As dress codes are
constructed as a marker of piety, veiled women can themselves be involved in affecting nonveiled women, by setting a standard that a “good Muslim woman” is covered. In this context
— and because the control of women is a cornerstone of fundamentalist politics —
conservative clerics feel entitled to use their authority to police women’s behavior. For
example, a Sunni mufti from Australia commented on a 2006 rape case, “compar[ing] women
who didn’t wear the hijab to uncovered meat left out for wild cats.”44 Such rhetoric (an
Islamist twist on a patriarchal classic) is proof that liberal democracies are not immune to
this type of propaganda. The impact on young girls is worth examining briefly.

V. Gender Equality and Increased Evidence of Early Veiling
I would nuance Yildirim’s claim that “the hair-covered Muslim woman [is] forced at the
periphery of socio-political formations.”45 There is evidence backing her point, and it is not my
intention to minimize the rise of very real anti-Muslim sentiments, especially post 9-11. Yet
Yildirim’s single focus on the victimization of veiled women diverts from another reality: the
increased acceptance of veiling throughout the world over the last couple of decades.
Concomitantly, the concept of freedom of religion is being used by ultra-conservative Muslims
(along with Western actors, often complicit or dismissive of the politicization of religion) to
justify legal “accommodations” of various kinds.46 Feminist theorist Gila Stopler, among
others, questions the implications of these developments for gender equality, and their
relative dismissal in current debates. She compares the “voluminous literature of liberalism”
that advocates “religious rights” and “equality of religious groups,” with the striking dearth of
attention given — even in legal-feminist writing — to “how the relationship between religion
and the state in liberal democracies affects the equality rights of all women.”47 Stopler’s
argument is that “the relationship between patriarchal religion and the state in liberal
democracies adversely affects the rights of all women, and that liberal states cannot live up to
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their commitment to women’s equality without significantly changing their relations with
patriarchal religions.”48
In terms of the veil specifically, demands for its accommodation in the private and public
sectors have been granted in various liberal democracies. For example, in 2004 in Australia,
the hijab was incorporated in the uniform of Victoria state police.49 In 2009, the Metropolitan
Police in London also accepted the hijab as an option for Muslim women serving in the force.
The retailer IKEA had agreed to a similar move in 2005, offering in some of its stores a
branded hijab to its female Muslim staff.50 Similar demands arise in the educational, health
or judicial systems, in sports arenas, etc. The “tendency to claim an ‘Islamic’ identity,
represented symbolically by the wearing of ‘Islamic dress’”51 must be seen as part of a
deliberate strategy, largely promoted by a
ultraconservative schools of thoughts within Islam.

political

constituency

representing

Nevertheless, Yildirim focuses on individuals — asking that societies “let the individual
girls and women define for themselves [what] constitutes dignity in their lives.”52 Some
European-based groups endorse a similar perspective, bringing together teenagers who argue
should decide for themselves what dress codes they wish to adopt.53 Yildirim also denounces
the “court’s idea of gender equality [that] robs the hijab wearing girl, children, and women of
any meaningful choice of control over their bodies.”54 One may wish to make a distinction
between teenagers and adults, and young girls — all of whom are conflated in Yildirim’s
quote. Given the strong influence of conservative non-state actors at the community level —
and if veiling is defended, as in Yildirim’s argument, as a choice, an expression of resistance,
a sign of agency from an adult perspective—one wonders how this framework applies to a
child with necessarily less negotiating power.
The fact is that, across various Muslim communities, veiling of young girls is on the rise. A
2010 testimony from Egypt reflects a reality that applies to many other contexts: “Anyone
walking on the streets of Egypt will notice a phenomenon that wasn’t so evident only a year
ago: the increasing numbers of little girls (and by “little,” I mean as young as eight years old)
wearing headscarves and abayas.”55 An effective way to convince young girls, and their
parents, about the necessity to appear “modest,” is often through the marketing of role
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models. Especially the marketing of “culturally appropriate” toys — enters “Fulla,” the
Muslim version of Barbie, wearing a black coat and head scarf. This doll is heavily promoted
on children’s TV channels: one commercial introducing a new line of doll clothes admonishes
“When you take Fulla out of the house, don’t forget her new spring abaya!” A clerk at a toy
store in Damascus says: “Fulla gives girls a more Islamic character to emulate, and parents
want that.”56 Makhmud Aripov, the imam of the Nabijon Haji Mosque in Osh, Kyrgyzstan,
would surely approve. Aripov told EurasiaNet that “Wearing a hijab secures a woman’s
chastity, and a lack of hijabs results in divorces. A mother wearing a hijab serves an example
for her daughter, which will help secure her honour.” Whether the veiling of young girls is
seen as evidence of increasing conservatism, of an early and undue sexualization process, or a
sign of modesty is disputed. But that children have less ability to decipher and contest
dominant discourses remains a fact.

VII. Conclusion
The issues raised by Yildirim (questions surrounding “women who cover their hair” and
“seek to participate in public space in liberal democracies”) are timely. Pakistani scholar
Farida Shaheed raises a point relevant to the debate: “The question that needs to be
answered is whether the adoption of a physical veil enhances or reduces the scope for social
change for women and the circumstances leading to one or the other.”57 However, Yildirim’s
chosen remedy — centered on minimizing state intervention — relies on the false premise
that all veiled women exercise free choice and that none face coercion.
It is a reality that human rights law does not offer a framework that is fully adequate in
balancing freedom of conscience and substantive equality. But this is not, as Yildirim
suggests, because international human rights law is inherently defective due to its Western
liberal roots. In fact, the notion of human rights as a Western construct is disputed by Islamic
scholars and women’s rights advocates in Muslim communities and beyond. It is necessary to
deconstruct this assumption, along with the claim that secularism is essentially Western.
Especially as Egyptian democrats are attempting to challenge Article 2 of the (Mubarak-era)
Constitution, which states that “the Islamic Sharia is the source of legalization in Egypt.”
This provision has long been criticized by local human rights organizations and feminist
activists precisely because of the gender biases associated with most mainstream
interpretations of Muslim laws.
Interestingly, the human rights arena has become a forum where fundamentalists (of all
persuasions) increasingly use religion and culture to lobby successfully. In spring 2011, the
UN Human Rights Council debated a resolution on “‘combating defamation of
religions’/’combating religious hatred and denigration of religions,’” which seeks to protect
“venerated personalities” from criticism, and to protect religions and religious symbols from
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“vilification”. 58 A coalition of civil society organizations warned that “the concept of
‘defamation’ or ‘denigration of religions’ is counterproductive to global efforts to combat
discrimination against religious minorities and serves to entrench repression and violence
against non-believers and political dissidents.”59 It also advocated for the recognition that
“religious beliefs, ideas and systems should not be exempt from discussion, debate or even
sharp criticism, whether from internal or external commentators.”60 Finally, this coalition
highlighted the “growing consensus that the concept of ‘defamation of religions,’ and similar
terminology, undermines and distorts existing international human rights guarantees on
freedom of expression, freedom of religion and non-discrimination.”61 These are hotly
contested issues — but Yildirim’s arguments can appear one-sided. A more balanced
approach will need to acknowledge both the increased Islamophobia in the West and the
strategies used by fundamentalist forces to promote their political agenda. While we ought to
recognize the multiplicity of meanings attached to the veil by individual women, we also must
identify the growth of fundamentalisms in liberal democracies and the fact that “gender
subordination is often deeply implicated in the emphasis on women covering their bodies.”62
If legal answers may appear relatively inadequate to deal with the complex issues of
religion and equality, it is in part because there are no uncontested interpretations of religion.
In addition, legal mechanisms do not acknowledge intra-minority group dynamics, their
internal debates, or dissenting voices. Should we conclude that “ironically, in order for the
state to be right in its codification of the demands of substantive gender equality, it must
ignore or simply override the nuanced and contested internal arguments within religious
communities themselves”?63 This would likely ignore that “people are bearers of both culture
and rights: acceptance of one does not imply rejection of the other. Both are contested
terrains, subject to constant shifts and negotiation.”64 Indeed, human rights law is itself an
evolving, dynamic framework, which over time reflects different views and concerns. As
Sudanese scholar An-Na’im has pointed out: “Religious freedom can [not] be advanced in
isolation of other fundamental human rights,”65 including the human rights of women.
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